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1 Introduction
I N late September 2006, a short letter arrived at the Secretariat of theWorld Trade Organization in Geneva that formally announced theentry into force of the United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement,
bringing the number of notiﬁed trade accords to 200. With every
preferential trade agreement (PTA) – an arrangement that liberalizes
trade between member states only – the principles of multilateralism
and non-discrimination in international trade as embodied by the
World Trade Organization (WTO) lose more relevance. When the
letter was received, already more than half of global commerce was
conducted under the rules of one PTA or another.
How different the world of international trade diplomacy looked
only twelve years earlier. After almost eight years of negotiations,
ministers of 109 countries shook hands in Marrakesh on April 15,
1994, on the occasion of the signature of the most ambitious multi-
lateral trade agreement in history. The ﬁnal deal brought agriculture
into the domain of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and created the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a
GATT counterpart for services, by then making up a third of global
commerce. Most importantly, it established the World Trade
Organization itself, a formal international institution with its own
staff and seat in Geneva (Barton et al. 2006: 93).
The mood was euphoric. US Vice-President Al Gore, who had ﬂown
in to address the meeting, called the deal “truly momentous.” Peter
Sutherland, the Irish Director General of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, said that he was tempted to dance a jig on the table to
express his joy.1 Multilateral liberalization appeared to be ﬁrmly estab-
lished. During the 1980s and early 1990s, many developing countries
had embraced an open trade policy and applied for GATTmembership.
1 This depiction of events draws on an article in the New York Times, April 16,
1994.
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They were joined by central and east European states that had emerged
from communist rule. Even China was in negotiations for accession.
Yet, today, multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the
WTO seem to be little more than a sideshow. Since the early 1990s the
world has seen an explosion of preferential trade agreements. Notably,
the majority are North–South agreements that bring together econo-
mies of vastly different sizes and levels of development.
The rapid proliferation of North–South PTAs is striking since, com-
pared with even minor tariff reductions on a multilateral basis, they do
not create much trade. The commitments to lower barriers they embody
are dwarfed by the unilateral steps taken by many emerging market
countries. Thanks to successive GATT negotiation rounds, most-
favored-nation (MFN) tariffs2 are at historically low levels. Trade
economists are divided over whether PTAs improve welfare (compare
inter alia Freund 2000; McLaren 2002), but almost unanimously judge
them a second-best solution to multilateral and unilateral liberalization.
But arguments against PTAs are not just theoretical. The multitude of
agreements creates a patchwork of different rules that burden exporters
with paperwork and bureaucracy, leading the chairman of Li & Fung,
Hong Kong’s largest trading company, to pronounce in the Financial
Times that “multilateralism creates value, bilateralism destroys
value.”3 If the complex rules are hard to follow for major trading
ﬁrms, then they are simply too costly to comply with for most compa-
nies from developing countries. One study shows that only half of the
imports into the European Union (EU) from least-developed countries
make use of the full tariff preferences available. The other half is covered
by MFN tariffs, since exporters would rather pay the higher duty than
deal with the documentation requirements (Brenton 2003).
Especially for developed countries, individual PTAs with developing
economies offer very limited export prospects. Even Mexico, a country
with a population of over 100 million, registered annual vehicle sales of
only 500,000 in 2005 – about the size of the auto market of Los
Angeles. Many PTAs speciﬁcally exclude those goods in which devel-
oping countries have a comparative advantage. Conventional exports
2 MFN tariffs are the duties countries charge on a non-discriminatory,
unconditional basis. Art. 1 of the GATT requires its signatories to grant market
access equal to “the most favored nation” unless, of course, they sign a preferential
agreement.
3 Financial Times, November 3, 2005.
2 Investing in protection
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are an unlikely explanation for the popularity of North–South PTAs.
Why, then, the sudden proliferation of these preferential trade agree-
ments? Why do major economic powers sign agreements with partners
that bring little market size and overall welfare beneﬁts?
This book argues that foreign direct investment (FDI) by multina-
tional ﬁrms and the attendant trade are key driving forces of North–
South PTAs. FDI ﬂowing from developed to developing countries
changes the incentives for governments in both, motivating them to
pursue bilateral and regional options because they satisfy the political
demands of multinational ﬁrms. As these ﬁrms invest in developing
countries to produce goods for developed markets, they call for the
reduction of barriers at home and abroad because it facilitates vertical
integration, or the specialization of production according to technolo-
gical capacity and labor cost. Firms produce high-end goods in the
North and low-end products that require cheaper labor in the South,
and ship these goods to the other partner.
Yet many multinational ﬁrms no longer see the WTO as the best way
to meet their trade liberalization needs. Unlike multilateral deals, pre-
ferential agreements for trade and investment offer a special beneﬁt:
They can be used to raise the barriers for competitors from non-member
states. Without such barriers, North–South liberalization would attract
“beachheads” of FDI from outsiders, turning the developing country
into a back door to themarket of the northern partner. TomakeNorth–
South liberalization politically feasible, governments therefore erect
new barriers as they tear down others.
Raising barriers requires the use of discriminatory tools. Since nearly
all recent PTAs are free trade agreements (FTAs)4 in which the members
set their own external tariffs, they require rules to determine the origin of
goods. In the absence of such rules, goods would simply be imported via
the partner country with the lower tariffs. These rules of origin (ROOs)
can be designed to the disadvantage of outsiders and to provide protec-
tion for insiders. A related mechanism is at work in the service sector,
which attracts a large share of FDI. Market and regulatory structures
penalize late entry and provide incentives for preferential liberalization.
4 Throughout the book, I refer to preferential agreements in general as PTAs, and to
FTAs only in speciﬁc cases where the legal text uses the term. This applies to the
FTAs between Japan and Mexico, Chile and the United States, the EU and Japan,
and Japan–Thailand and Japan–Malaysia.
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North–South PTAs thus trigger an endogenous dynamic unanticipated
by earlier proponents of preferential trade agreements: other countries
conclude defensive agreements with the host country out of fear of being
shut out of markets and production locations. North–South PTAs are
therefore not just a beauty contest among developing countries over who
is the most open to foreign trade and hence to be rewarded trade agree-
ments with rich partners, as the former US Trade Representative (USTR)
Robert Zoellick suggested when he coined the term “competitive liberal-
ization.” It is a contest between major economic powers to gain access to
emerging markets and important production locations, to impede such
access for competitors, and to restore it when others have moved ﬁrst.
This book offers a political economy account of the endogenous
competition driving much of the proliferation of North–South PTAs.
The approach assumes that governments decide their policies in response
to pressures from organized societal groups. Although political variables
may shape the decision to pursue PTAs, I emphasize the economic
incentives that cause their proliferation, since even a PTA concluded for
non-economic reasons is likely to have redistributive effects within and
between countries. At the centre of the argument is a model of trade
policy formation at the domestic and systemic level. Domestic sources of
trade policy, in particular the interests of multinational ﬁrms, lead to
policy outcomes at the international level. Since these interests not only
inﬂuence the decisions to seek trade agreements, but also the design of
PTAs, they have (at times unintended) consequences that reverberate
abroad. Multinational ﬁrms in other countries in turn seek to inﬂuence
the trade policy choices of their home government.
Through several case studies the following chapters explain how this
process results in a spiraling model of more and more PTAs. The
in-depth case studies cover the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the two defensive agreements with Mexico signed by
Japan and the EU. I then apply the framework to several cases of North–
South PTAs concluded in recent years: Japan’s FTAs with Thailand and
Malaysia, and the FTAs with Chile signed by the United States, the EU,
and Japan.
Unequal partners: the proliferation of North–South PTAs
If trade liberalization is deﬁned as the lowering of tariff barriers, the
GATT should be considered a spectacular success. Negotiations have
4 Investing in protection
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cut down manufactured goods tariffs on MFN basis from an average
of over 50 percent to between 5 and 10 percent. Most manufactured
imports into the industrialized countries face near-zero or no tariffs.
In the light of this achievement, the sheer number of North–South PTAs
signed in recent years is particularly striking. A closer look at the
institutional features of the global trade regime and the character of
recent PTAs shows that today’s agreements coincide with profound
changes in the world economy. Developing countries have reintegrated
with the global economy, causing changes in the character of investment
in these “emerging markets” and affecting the multilateral trade regime
in turn. As such, this trend does not herald a return to the protectionist
blocs of the 1930s. The scope of recent PTAs, covering new issues
beyond trade in goods, their character as partnerships between coun-
tries of unequal levels of development, and their often “extra-regional”
geography set them apart from past trade arrangements.
The experience of the interwar years, when retaliatory tariffs led to
the creation of protectionist blocs, provided the initial impetus for the
United States to support the creation of the GATT. Based on the con-
stitutive norm of non-discrimination as expressed in MFN tariffs,
Article XXIV of the GATT stipulates that regional integration measures
have to conform to three standards. First, they should cover substan-
tially all trade. Second, they should liberalize trade between the mem-
bers within a reasonable time frame. Third, they must not raise the
barriers against third parties above the initial MFN level at which tariffs
are “bound” by GATT members. However, many developing counties
apply much lower tariffs than their bound rates, leaving room for
increases in tariff rates. Moreover, no similar clause exists with regard
to non-tariff barriers such as rules of origin or the regulation of FDI.
Although PTAs have to be “nested,” or made compliant with the over-
arching GATT/WTO regime,5 the weak disciplines of Article XXIV give
states considerable freedom in creating discriminatory measures.
Because of the leeway given by the GATT, PTAs vary in their cover-
age of trade and in the inclusion of the ﬂows of the factors capital and
labor. A considerable number of agreements fall under the “enabling
clause” of the GATT that allows developing countries to sign agreements
among themselves with generous time frames for tariff reduction, often
5 See Aggarwal (1998) and Aggarwal and Urata (2006) for an analysis of the
“nesting” of multiple international regimes.
Introduction 5
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 11:42:57 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511635311.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
resulting in little or no actual liberalization.Many recent PTAs have this
declaratory character. Other agreements only reafﬁrm existing tariff-
free trade between states that previously belonged to the same political
entity, as in the 1992 FTA signed by Slovakia and the Czech Republic,
or agreements between former Soviet republics. Finally, some agree-
ments are superseded by later PTAs, while others are suspended for
political reasons.6
Counting only the PTAs in force and joint GATS Article V (trade in
services) and GATT Article XXIV (trade in goods) agreements such as
NAFTA as a single institutional package, we arrive at a cumulative
ﬁgure of about 170 PTAs in 2008. Taking a minimum difference of
US$15,000 in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing
power parity terms as threshold to count a country as “developed,”
about 100 are “North–South PTAs” – here used as a shorthand,
although some “Southern” countries such as Macedonia and Armenia
(partners of the EU and Switzerland, respectively) would be better
characterized as economies in transition. This ﬁgure is much smaller
than is to be expected based on the number of countries involved, since
the EU has a common external trade policy and the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA) member states7 usually negotiate agreements
jointly. This study focuses on the growing subset of PTAs between
pairs of countries that are highly unequal in their level of development
and the size of their economies.
Figure 1.1 is a graph of the growth of these agreements over time.
Until 1991, North–South PTAswere limited to a handful of agreements,
mostly between the European Community and its close neighbors, such
as the EC–Malta FTA of 1971. The turning point came in the early
1990s, when countries in Latin America and many former communist
countries began to seek PTAs, andwhen the United States, the creator of
the GATT regime and the biggest importer, turned to North–South
agreements. By the mid-1990s, the trend was in full swing.
Notably, the number of North–North agreements has in fact
decreased in recent years, as several central and east European countries
have joined the EU (Pomfret 2007). North–South agreements as deﬁned
6 Whalley (2008) offers a thorough overview and warns against alarmist double-
counting of PTAs.
7 Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.
6 Investing in protection
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Downloa ed from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Fri Mar 23 11:42:57 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511635311.002
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
here are experiencing the fastest growth of all PTAs.8 Almost all are
classiﬁed as FTAs rather than as customs unions, the sole exception
being the 1996 EU–Turkey agreement.
Advanced developing countries such as Chile, Mexico, or Thailand
are preferred partners in today’s agreements. Prior to liberalization in
the developing world, commercial interests from the North were limited
to resource extraction, “tariff-jumping” investment by multinational
ﬁrms, or, in the case of many “developmental states,” closely circum-
scribed domains of export-oriented production. Liberalization creates
new opportunities and thus the incentives for interested parties in
industrialized countries to lobby for agreements to secure preferential
access.
In Latin America, unilateral liberalization represented the ﬁrst step in
overcoming the legacy of import-substitution industrialization.9 During
most of the 1950s–1980s, multinational ﬁrms produced outdated pro-
ducts, protected by high tariffs, for domestic sales in markets such as
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Figure 1.1 Growth of North–South PTAs, 1971–2007.
Source: WTO Secretariat; McGill Trade Agreements Database, http://ptas.
mcgill.ca.
8 See also Fiorentino et al. (2006) for a slightly different classiﬁcation that reaches a
similar conclusion.
9 Imports were to be substituted by domestic production, protected by high tariffs
and quotas on imports. For a succinct description of these policies and their
unintended effects, see Krueger (1995a), esp. chapter 1.
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Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Using various performance require-
ments, for example the sourcing of a percentage of inputs or mandatory
export of a share of the production, governments attempted to harness
the beneﬁts of foreign capital (Caves 1996; Greenaway 1992). To
compensate multinational ﬁrms for high tariffs and host country
requirements, governments struck deals that sheltered investors from
competition and offered economic rents (Evans 1979). While the provi-
sion of services remained in the hands of governments, the high tariffs
and restrictions made exports and investment by smaller ﬁrms from
developed countries infeasible. FDI sought markets, but under the
speciﬁc conditions of the import-substitution policy of the host country.
As Latin American countries began to liberalize in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in search of foreign capital, they became attractive for a
different kind of investment integrated with world markets.
Despite important differences from Latin American countries, Asian
“developmental states” (Wade 1990) attracted similarly inward-oriented
FDI. Multinational ﬁrms, in this case mostly from Japan, enjoyed exclu-
sivemarket share arrangements for their products.While export-oriented
investment caught the attention of many scholars, it was nearly always
limited to a few industries – mostly computer parts and consumer elec-
tronics manufacturing in east and southeast Asia, especially in Taiwan,
Singapore, and Malaysia. Following the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis,
liberalization has reached this region as well.
As other sources of capital such as bank loans have dried up, coun-
tries in both regions have been forced to compete for investment. In this
competition, governments see direct investment as preferable to volatile
portfolio capital ﬂows. Table 1.1 shows the growth in total net FDI
inﬂows since 1987.10 From a low base of less than 10 percent of global
FDI, developing countries received a growing share of capital ﬂows
during the 1990s, with a peak of almost 36 percent in 1997. Although
China’s share of FDI to developing countries alone made up a third on
average, other developing countries received massive inﬂows as well.
The growing share ﬂowing to developing countries drew on a steadily
larger volume of global capital: measured in constant US dollars, for-
eign direct investment ﬂows have grown more than sixfold since 1987.
10 To facilitate comparison, all dollar ﬁgures throughout the book have been
deﬂated to constant values using the US consumer price index with the year 2000
as base.
8 Investing in protection
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Moreover, the raw ﬁgures obscure qualitative differences. While
high-income countries still receive close to two-thirds of total direct
investment, much of this FDI consists of the acquisition of existing
ﬁrms. A larger proportion of FDI to developing countries is made up
of “greenﬁeld investment” that leads to the construction of new produc-
tion facilities. As is repeatedly stressed in UNCTAD reports (e.g.
2004a), FDI is by now the most important source of foreign capital
for developing countries.
In various ways these investment ﬂows are linked to international
agreements. For developing countries, combined free trade and invest-
ment agreements offer an institutional package that locks in unilateral
Table 1.1. Net global FDI inﬂows and country shares
Country shares as a percentage
Year
Global FDI
(US$ billion)
High-income
countries
Developing
world
Of which
China
1987 178 90.3 8.1 1.8
1988 209 85.2 12.2 2.0
1989 248 86.6 11.9 1.7
1990 251 84.2 11.9 1.7
1991 186 73.7 22.1 2.8
1992 194 67.7 29.8 6.6
1993 249 66.4 30.3 12.5
1994 275 60.3 35.4 13.6
1995 357 64.5 31.7 10.9
1996 398 62.3 34.1 10.7
1997 491 59.6 35.9 9.4
1998 722 71.4 24.2 6.3
1999 1,119 79.5 16.2 3.5
2000 1,518 83.5 10.9 2.5
2001 779 72.5 21.7 5.5
2002 708 75.1 21.8 6.7
2003 608 69.7 25.0 7.3
2004 708 62.9 29.1 7.1
2005 929 66.4 27.5 7.5
2006 1160 65.8 27.2 5.8
Source:World Development Indicators Online 2008. All ﬁgures
deﬂated to constant US$2,000.
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liberalization and provides guarantees for investors beyond WTO
commitments (Fernández and Portes 1998). These beneﬁts resemble
those promised by the growing number of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), another product of the competition for foreign capital (Elkins
et al. 2006). In addition to these advantages, trade agreements with an
industrialized partner, even with only modest tariff reductions, give a
developing country an edge over competitors with similar factor endow-
ments (Ethier 1998a, 1998b, 2001). Both beneﬁts explainwhy developing
countries seek bilateral agreements with developed countries.
Less obvious is why these developed countries should take up the
offer. Most developing countries are negligible export markets. In terms
of national income,Mexico offered US ﬁrms barely 6 percent additional
market size when NAFTA entered into force.11 Foreign direct invest-
ment, however, creates powerful incentives for multinational ﬁrms to
offer political support for PTAs beyond what the potential for conven-
tional exports would lead us to expect.
Following the reintegration of many developing countries into the
world economy, they attract manufacturing FDI to serve as export
platforms to (mostly) developed-country markets. Sometimes, labor-
intensive stages of production are moved to developing countries. At
other times, multinational ﬁrms relocate the manufacturing of mass-
market goods to low-cost countries, but keep the production of key
components and high-end products at home. In addition, manufactur-
ing FDI entails exports of machinery (capital goods) and inputs such as
parts (intermediate goods) to the FDI host. One of the most important
purposes of PTAs is to liberalize the trade in goods generated by FDI –
much more so than the regulation of FDI in manufacturing itself or the
reduction of tariffs on other exports.
Manufacturing FDI also creates a market for related services, for
example insurance of exports or ﬁnancing of direct investment.
Moreover, since most developing countries have only recently begun
to open their ﬁnancial and telecommunications service markets, FDI in
services represents a considerable share of the capital ﬂows to emerging
markets. Provisions for FDI in PTAs therefore apply in large measure to
these ﬂows.
11 In concrete numbers, a GDP of merely US$466 billion compared with US GDP of
US$7.7 trillion, adjusted for purchasing-power parity.
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Perspectives on preferential trade agreements
Earlier theoretical traditions in International Relations explained PTAs
as a symptom of hegemonic decline and the inability of the United States
to keep the multilateral trade regime open and non-discriminatory.
Neoliberalism conceived of trade agreements as one cooperation pro-
blem among many, arguing that greater numbers of states engaged in
negotiations make it more difﬁcult to come to an agreement. PTAs can
therefore be seen as the inevitable by-product as many countries join the
WTO, mounting transaction costs make negotiations more difﬁcult,
and governments look for alternative venues for trade liberalization.
These interpretations still have purchase today. Mansﬁeld and
Reinhardt (2003) show that the growth of WTO membership, the
recurrent negotiation rounds, and, in particular, the participation in
trade disputes motivate states to seek PTAs as an insurance policy:
should WTO rounds fail or end up deadlocked, states secure export
markets. Likewise, PTAs can serve as coalition-building strategy to
increase bargaining power or to “obtain countervailing market access”
(Mansﬁeld and Reinhardt 2003: 830) for countries that lose in WTO
disputes. Moreover, the growth in the sheer number of PTAs will lead
states to pursue such deals, as institutional templates become available
and competitors use them to secure outlets for their exports.
Yet although PTAs improve market access, the gains are often cir-
cumscribed. Usually, both parties reserve the right to use theWTO as an
avenue for settling claims, even if the PTA contains elaborate dispute
settlement mechanisms. PTAs with the United States in particular do
not offer protection from US trade remedy laws. While a stalled multi-
lateral negotiating round leads countries to a search for alternative
venues for trade deals, it cannot be the only factor at work. The number
of North–South PTAs exploded after the last WTO round, while earlier
waves of PTAs reached their peak during GATT negotiations as coun-
tries sought to gain leverage, as Mansﬁeld and Reinhardt show.
System-level explanations also offer only limited insight into the cross-
regional variation in the spread of preferential trade agreements: PTAs
have spread quickly in the Western hemisphere, but have only recently
arrived in Asia (Ravenhill 2003), reigniting scholarly interest in turn
(Aggarwal and Urata 2006; Dent 2006; Pempel 2006). The peculiar
pattern of how PTAs have spread across the globe and the recent surge
in North–South agreements invite a search for additional causal factors.
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As Haggard (1997) has argued, the foremost reason for the impasse
at the WTO table is the convergence or divergence of state interests, in
particular over the seemingly intractable issue of agricultural liberal-
ization. Katada et al. (in press) submit that major economic powers
often prefer to deal bilaterally with a weaker partner because they can
control the negotiating agenda to favor their internationally oriented
businesses while protecting declining sectors.While this argument sheds
light on some of the beneﬁts of bilateral deals for developed countries, it
cannot explain why states rarely chose this route until the early 1990s.
Why do the interests of states converge on preferential rather than
multilateral liberalization? Why has this convergence manifested itself
so strongly in recent years?
Despite a multitude of studies, we have few answers to these ques-
tions. Economists have focused on the effects of PTAs on national and
world aggregate welfare from a Pareto-optimality perspective. Most
economists agree that multilateral liberalization is preferable to bilat-
eral agreements. Just how preferable depends on the Pareto criterion:
PTAs could still be desirable as long as they make some countries better
and none worse off. The classic formulations by Viner (1950), Lipsey
(1957), and Meade (1955) argued that PTAs can be welfare enhancing
if more trade is created than diverted away frommore efﬁcient countries
outside the arrangement. Kemp and Wan (1976) raised the prospect
that PTAs can be constructed in a way that makes at least one member
better off, but does not affect outsiders. Later contributions found that
welfare effects tend to be ambiguous (Panagariya 1999, 2000).
With the second wave of regional trade agreements in the 1980s, the
focus shifted from these “static” considerations to “dynamic issues”:
are PTAs “stumbling blocks” or “building blocks” (Bhagwati 1991)
towards global free trade? Krishna (1998) argues that trade diversion
reduces the incentives for parties to a bilateral agreement to reduce trade
multilaterally. Levy (1997) even contends that bilateral PTAs can make
multilateral liberalization politically unviable, while McLaren (2002)
warns that PTAs can induce member countries to make relation-speciﬁc
investments that inhibit future multilateral liberalization. Much of the
criticism depends on howmuch trade is actually being created by PTAs,
with recent studies suggesting a much stronger positive effect (Baier and
Bergstrand 2007; Magee 2008). These beneﬁts also help to explain the
motivation for “natural” – that is, geographically close – partners to
form PTAs. Yet it is doubtful how relevant these ﬁndings are for today’s
12 Investing in protection
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agreements between distant partners. Themost prominent study of PTA
formation motivated by welfare gains (Baier and Bergstrand 2004)
relies on a dyadic dataset that ranges only until 1996, with almost 60
percent of the PTA formation outcomes driven by two political entities,
the EU and EFTA.
To understand the motivation behind North–South PTAs, we need to
focus on the two different forces that tend to inﬂuence the foreign
economic policy of individual states: reactions to policies of other
countries and to domestic political demands. Government policy often
reﬂects the interests of strong and well-organized societal groups
(Grossman and Helpman 1994), although mediated by the domestic
institutions that offer or restrict access to governments (Mansﬁeld and
Busch 1995; Nelson 1988).
Since multinational ﬁrms are responsible for most international
trade, their interests are an obvious starting point for the analysis. In
Milner’s framework, governments balance producer and consumer
interests. Public ofﬁcials therefore seek the support of industrial sectors,
some of which will be in favor of liberalization. Firms support regional
liberalization because it allows the mutual reduction of tariff barriers by
“trading scale economies across industries” (Milner 1997: 91), in effect
balancing costs and beneﬁts between exporters in the two partner
countries.
Along similar lines, Busch and Milner (1994: 270) put the growing
importance of exports and intra-industry trade at the centre of their
explanation of ﬁrm preferences. Producers that can achieve economies
of scale in home markets are more competitive globally, leading them to
demand regional trade agreements. This demand will be most pro-
nounced when ﬁrms are competitive in terms of technology and man-
agement but lack the sizable home market to achieve the optimum
efﬁciency. Milner cites the example of Canadian ﬁrms that supported
NAFTA. Chase (2005) develops this approach further by showing that
support for regional trade agreements since the end of World War I
corresponded closely to the economies of scale that important industries
achieved depending on their level of technology.12
12 But see Thompson (1994), who argues that Canadian ﬁrms were particularly
opposed to further liberalization. Since Canada and the United States had signed
an FTA before NAFTA was proposed, Canada’s initial interest in NAFTA was
limited to the protection of the gains made in the CUSFTA (Cameron and Tomlin
2000: 63–64).
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However, adding market size through North–South PTAs may not be
the key to achieving economies of scale. Most developing country mar-
kets are too small to move ﬁrms down the cost curve towards greater
efﬁciency. The drive to achieve greater economies of scale offers a con-
vincing account of PTAs between developed countries or the political
support for a large commonmarket like that of the European Union, but
without a commensurate explosion in returns to scale, it does not explain
the exponential growth of North–South PTAs in recent years.
In a series of papers, Chase (2003, 2004) seeks to address this
problem, arguing that multinational corporations lobby for regional
agreements with developing countries because of the growth in offshore
processing. Many of these ﬁrms, however, face a legacy of sunk invest-
ments originally made under protectionist host country policies. They
therefore press for barriers to non-members to provide breathing room
while they restructure.
Temporary relief is one aspect of non-tariff barriers, but not the most
important. A growing literature demonstrates how rules of origin and
other barriers have become a strategic policy instrument that ﬁrms try to
manipulate to their advantage (Duttagupta and Panagariya 2003;
Krishna 1998; Krishna and Krueger 1995; Suominen 2004). When a
host country still retains high MFN tariffs – typical of many developing
countries – rules of origin and tariffs interact to raise the costs for non-
member ﬁrms. If member ﬁrms mainly source inputs from within the
FTA, then ROOs are a costless device for insiders to extend protection-
ism to the host country and to gain the political support of intermediate
goods producers. ROOs therefore either divert trade to producers in the
PTA while inducing producers from non-members to relocate produc-
tion into the PTA, or they create additional costs for outsiders.
The discriminatory aspect of PTAs, I argue, is one of the greatest
attractions for multinational ﬁrms. The account in this book expands
on political economy models that predict that preferential agreements
are most likely to be formed when they divert trade, because the gains to
exporters then outweigh the costs to import-competing industries
(Grossman and Helpman 1995; Panagariya and Findlay 1996). The
unintended consequence of such trade diversion is the reaction by other
countries. Excluded parties can counter PTAs in two possible ways: they
can either form PTAs among themselves, or they can attempt to join an
existing agreement to prevent trade diversion. Baldwin (1996) calls this
the “domino effect of regional trade agreements.”
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Although the domino theory appears to be an apt description of the
progressive expansion of the EC/EU, it faces a fundamental challenge:
only in the rarest of instances have PTAs been shown to divert trade,
and even these ﬁndings are sensitive to econometric speciﬁcations
(Magee 2008). Even NAFTA, with its unusually restrictive rules of
origin, has not had measurable negative effects on trade with non-
members (Aussilloux and Pajot 2002; Krueger 1999). In fact, when a
developing country signs a PTA, in most cases its trade with members
and non-members alike increases signiﬁcantly. North–South PTAs
often coincide with other economic reforms in developing countries
and should in principle boost growth by attracting foreign investment.
Moreover, “beachhead” FDI from outsiders in one country in order to
serve themarkets of the parties to the agreement will increase trade as its
complement. As a result, many PTAs appear to have the counterintui-
tive effect of creating trade with the outside world. Neither the diversion
of trade in ﬁnished goods based on comparative advantage, economies
of scale, or stalledmultilateral negotiations at theWTO seem to account
fully for the recent explosion of North–South PTAs. Changing the focus
to foreign direct investment explains this outcome.
Firms, states, and their investment in protection: an overview
of the argument
North–South PTAs offer a variety of advantages to ﬁrms, depending on
the sector in which investment takes place. In many service industries
the ﬁrst ﬁrm to enter a developing country market opened through a
PTA enjoys advantages over later entrants. In manufacturing, PTAs
allow ﬁrms to lower the cost of an internationally fragmented produc-
tion while preventing competitors from non-member countries from
obtaining the same beneﬁts. These beneﬁts are less evident at an aggre-
gate economic level, but are clearly visible at the level of individual
ﬁrms.13
In services, the structure of many markets confers important ﬁrst-
mover advantages. Many service industries are textbook examples of
13 Since within PTAs FDI ﬂows primarily from North to South, the following refers
to the developed country as the “home” country, the developing economy as the
“host.”
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oligopolies or natural monopolies, in which efﬁcient production
requires a dominant market share. First-movers with enough capital
can buy up existing assets – such as telecommunications networks or
branches in retail banking – and attain a commanding position. These
ﬁrms will be able to offer their products at a lower cost than later
entrants because with a larger market share ﬁrst-movers produce on a
greater, more efﬁcient scale. Competitors would have to make signiﬁ-
cant investments before reaching proﬁtability. Preferential liberaliza-
tion therefore threatens to shut out competitors. Because the ﬁrst-mover
advantage is the result of market structures rather than the reduction of
barriers, this applies even if host country laws on FDI are subsequently
made non-discriminatory – that is, if liberalization is multilateralized
later. In addition, ﬁrst-mover ﬁrms may attempt to inﬂuence important
regulations in a way that raises rivals’ cost of market entry. As emerging
market countries move towards the liberalization of services, the over-
haul or, in some cases, initial creation of regulatory regimes becomes
necessary, e.g. in the provision of ﬁnancial services and the protection of
investor and intellectual property rights. With the primary exporters of
these services located in developed countries, this process creates an
interest in inﬂuencing the regulation to adapt models used in the home
country, thus lowering the barrier to entry for their providers and
raising them for others (Wunsch-Vincent 2003).14 In manufacturing,
liberalization creates the opportunity to use the advantages of speciﬁc
locations in the production of goods. Capital-intensive production
takes place in developed countries that offer access to high technology
and research and design facilities and personnel. Labor-intensive stages
of production are outsourced to the developing world. This vertical
fragmentation of production leads to an increase in intra-industry trade,
or trade in the same industry in differentiated goods. Unlike intra-
industry trade between developed countries, however, the traded
goods are differentiated by “quality”: developing countries are more
likely to export low-cost goods, while developed countries export high-
cost, high-quality goods. For example, while many car manufacturers
produce their upscale vehicles in their home country, entry-level cars are
produced in less developed countries. A typical case is the German car
14 See also Mattli and Büthe (2003) for the importance of international standards
and regulations in providing advantages to some ﬁrms over others.
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manufacturing company Volkswagen that assembles most of its high-
end models in Germany, but produces its entry-level Polo and Golf
models in the Czech Republic and Brazil.
Moreover, such investment implies an enormous increase in trade in
intermediate goods: parts production often takes place in specialized
factories to achieve efﬁcient production scales. The same parts are then
shipped to different locations. Fragmented production thus creates a
demand for tariff reduction in home and host countries.While transport
costs are less and less important, not every country is equally attractive
as a location of production. Proximity to developed country markets, as
well as other factors such as available primary materials, turn access to
these locations into competitive advantages.
The decisions ﬁrms make in a globalizing world explain their interest
in the reduction of barriers to trade and investment in general, but not
the popularity of preferential agreements. Unilateral or multilateral
liberalization could lower tariff barriers between developed and deve-
loping countries, allowing trade and investment to produce efﬁciency
gains without a multitude of different rules. Politics, however, opens
the door to preferential treatment. While a North–South PTA allows
ﬁrms to produce abroad where costs are lower, it also exposes the
home market to foreign competition; nothing would prevent ﬁrms from
third countries from investing in the developing partner country and
using it as an export base. Firms and labor in the North will therefore
try to minimize the threat of entry of competitors. When two countries
with very different wage levels liberalize bilateral trade, ﬁrms and work-
ers in manufacturing industries will often try to raise the barriers for
outsiders.
In this situation, non-tariff barriers such as ROOs, an essential part of
all preferential agreements, can be structured to increase the cost of
production for ﬁrms from non-member countries. Despite earlier liber-
alization, developing country tariffs are still higher than theMFN tariffs
of developed countries. Sufﬁciently strict rules of origin in an FTA
interact with the remaining tariff to extend protection: ﬁrms from
within the PTA can produce in the host country, and import intermedi-
ate goods from and reexport goods to the home market without costly
tariffs. By contrast, ﬁrms from non-member countries can only import
parts from home at a high price – if they exceed the rule of origin, they
pay the initial tariff on the intermediate good, and often the MFN tariff
on exports to the developed country as well. The barriers against
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outsiders created by a PTA therefore beneﬁt both ﬁrms and workers in
the partner countries.
Theoretically, ﬁrms would be induced to switch to suppliers from
within the FTA, the classic case of trade diversion. However, ﬁrms often
cannot easily change suppliers with whom they have long-standing
relationships. Principal suppliers within the FTA may have close ties
to the competition. Assuming that they do not choose to exit and
surrender the FTA market to their competitors, how do non-member
ﬁrms react?
Since they cannot inﬂuence the ROOs in the ﬁrst PTA, non-member
ﬁrms have to tackle the second part of the protectionist policy: theMFN
tariff of the host country. Without tariffs, rules of origin lose much of
their force. The obvious reaction is to lobby the host government to
lower its duties. But unless negotiated within the framework of a PTA,
the rules of the GATT prescribe that MFN tariffs can only be lowered
for imports from all member countries. There is little that foreign ﬁrms
can offer to motivate a developing country to do so since the political
costs for the host country governments would normally be too high,
unless they can convince their home governments to strike a deal with
the host country. To retain their competitiveness, non-member ﬁrms
therefore seek recourse with their home governments. The defensive
reaction of these non-member ﬁrms is an unintended consequence of
the ﬁrst PTA – they likewise call for a PTA with the same developing
country. Since intermediate and capital goods exporters in non-member
countries are hurt by the same ROOs and tariffs, they become allies in
this undertaking. Likewise, excluded service ﬁrms that witness prefer-
ential liberalization will try to level the playing ﬁeld. Even though ﬁrms
from non-member countries may not have been interested in a PTAwith
the host country originally, they will now come to support it to prevent
exclusion from an important host of FDI. In response, their home
governments also negotiate PTAs with the host country – the dominos
fall, causing an endogenous proliferation of bilateral trade agreements
driven by FDI in developing countries.
This account also helps to explain the variation in the spread of PTAs
across the globe. Developing countries in the Americas were the ﬁrst to
liberalize their economies and to attract FDI in manufacturing and
services. The important trade and investment links and the discrimina-
tory measures of PTAs almost immediately triggered defensive PTAs.
The cumulative effect of these agreements eventually reached more
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distant countries in Europe and Asia.15 When the Asian ﬁnancial crisis
forced liberalization on several developing countries in the region, the
endogenous dynamic came into full force again.
In sum, two factors emerge as the driving forces behind North–South
PTAs: concentrated interests in FDI-exporting countries have a strong
incentive to lobby for preferential agreements because they confer
speciﬁc advantages over competitors. To be politically attractive, these
agreements must have a discriminatory effect on trade and investment
with non-members. This effect manifests itself mainly for ﬁrms from
other countries that are disadvantaged in their ability to use developing
countries as export platforms, or that are excluded from services mar-
kets. These ﬁrms push their home governments for defensive agree-
ments16 to remain competitive.
Methodology
If this study’s central claim of an endogenous proliferation of PTAs holds,
then its explanation presents a challenge for standard comparative me-
thods. While comparative analysis has developed a nuanced set of
approaches for different problems (George and Bennett 2005; King
et al. 1994), it ultimately rests on two assumptions: that the cases are
completely independent and, if several cases are affected by the same
common external force, that this factor is truly exogenous. Usually the
analyst pairs cases according some variation ofMill’s (1843) “method of
difference” to identify the variable(s) that are responsible for variation in
outcomes while other factors are held constant, even if they are common
inﬂuences such as having been part of the same colonial empire. Such
research designs have demanding requirements for “unit homogeneity”
(King et al. 1994: 91–94). More recent studies of the effects of globaliza-
tion (e.g. Tiberghien 2007) have assumed that an external force affects all
cases equally, so that domestic institutions and interests explain the
15 See also Dent (2006: 49–50) for how Asian PTAs mimic extra-regional models.
The effect is also partly captured in the empirical work of Mansﬁeld and
Reinhardt (2003): countries are more likely to sign PTAs with geographically
proximate countries and important trade partners, especially when these
countries are signing preferential agreements.
16 Use of the terms “offensive” and “defensive” in relation to agreements seems to
have been coined by ofﬁcials at Japan’s Ministry of the Economy, Trade, and
Industry (METI).
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variation in outcomes. The cases in this book, by contrast, are assumed to
be interdependent. The model proposed is dynamic in the sense that the
conclusion of one PTA will trigger several others. How can a model like
this be tested without resorting to circular reasoning?
As argued by Büthe (2002: 485), modeling sequences of events offers
a solution: Sequence “allows us to have causal feedback loops from the
explanandum at one point in time to the explanatory variables at a later
point in time only” (emphasis in original). Accordingly, I develop a
model that predicts a sequence of decisions and feedback effects.
Differences in the cases will therefore manifest in variation over time
in the outcomes dependent on the strength of the causal factors.
To test this model I develop individual analytic narratives for each
case study, emphasizing process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005:
211–81) to identify the constraints and variables that matter to the
actors in their decision-making. In developing these accounts, the
model provides the cast of actors, their interests and strategies
(McKeown 1999). I begin by outlining two ideal types of North–
South PTAs, an “offensive” type of agreement in which outsiders are
discriminated against, and a “defensive” type that counters these
effects. I then develop a model that establishes causal relations. My
cases are dyads of countries with different factor endowments in which
foreign direct investment ﬂows predominantly in one direction. The
independent variables are the political demands made by ﬁrms and
other actors such as labor unions in the capital-exporting countries,
while the actual institutional outcomes (trade and investment liberal-
ization in preferential trade agreements) form the dependent variables.
One of the most important sources of variation in outcomes is the
strength of trade and investment links and resultant political demands
within a particular dyad compared with other dyads involving the same
host country. Consider the (not entirely) hypothetical example of South
Africa as a host country for FDI. The strongest trade and investment
links exist between the EU and South Africa, followed by the United
States and Japan. The FTA between the EU and the South Africa affects
more US ﬁrms than Japanese competitors, so that ceteris paribus, we are
more likely to see a political reaction in US trade policy than in Japan.
The case studies are based on qualitative data collected through the
analysis of interest group publications, documented lobbying activity
such as congressional hearings, and over seventy interviews with
decision-makers in government and the private sector. Given different
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political systems, such data cannot be truly “symmetric” (King et al.
1994: 48) in the sense that a uniform method of collecting information
is used in all cases: lobbying in Japan leaves no visible paper trail, while
evidence of comparable activities in the United States is often publicly
available. These problems preclude a cross-sectional quantitative ana-
lysis of the effect of lobbying. Detailed process-tracing is the only
feasible technique for testing hypotheses in this situation. To isolate
the competition between major developed countries from those char-
acterizing the bilateral relationship with the developing country, I focus
on cases in which the trade policy of the latter remained constant.
The ﬁrst case study focuses on NAFTA, the “original” and, in terms
of trade and investment ﬂows, still the most important North–South
agreement. Since most of its clauses have been in effect for over a
decade, it is possible to analyze outcomes among members as well as
longer-term reactions among non-members to this offensive move. The
North American deal also provided the institutional template for a
variety of other agreements.
I then compare two defensive agreements: the EU–Mexico FTA as a
response to NAFTA, and the Japan–Mexico FTA as countermove to
both prior agreements. In particular the case of the EU–Mexico
“Association Agreement” and the time lag to the conclusion of the
Japan–Mexico “Economic Partnership Agreement” strengthen the
argument: given the stronger investment interests, the EU moved faster
to counter the effects of NAFTA. The European initiative in turn
spurred Japan on to pursue its own FTA with Mexico. Mexico’s policy
remained consistent throughout the negotiations of all three agree-
ments: it proposed each of them, but then negotiated defensively for
all of them with the exception of speciﬁc agricultural exports.
In a third step I include cases in which the competitive dynamic is
restricted to only one sector: services in the case of the FTAs of the
United States and the European Union with Chile, and manufacturing
in the cases of the Japanese FTAs with Thailand and Malaysia. The
cases also changed the roles of key actors. In Chile, the United States and
the European Union competed neck and neck after the United States’
initial objective of Chile’s accession to NAFTA had failed. Again,
Chile’s trade policy remained consistent in all the cases studied here:
Chile sought FTAs with all major trade partners.
Finally, in the cases of the Japanese FTAs with Thailand and
Malaysia, I focus on differences in the bilateral trade and investment
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relationship with the partner countries to bring the differing political
coalitions into relief. Malaysia had fewer export interests regarding
Japan compared with Thailand, leading to a quick conclusion of the
negotiations with the former compared with the protracted bargaining
with Thailand. These cases provide evidence that North–South agree-
ments are unlikely to liberalize trade beyond the narrow interests of
multinational ﬁrms with investment in the partner countries and their
suppliers. It is noteworthy that the Japanese agreements with the
ASEAN countries have likewise triggered defensive countermoves by
the United States and the EU.
Caveats, limitations, and contributions
As with most political agreements, it is impossible to identify a single
variable as decisive for the conclusion of an individual PTA. This
applies to both the theoretical and the empirical dimensions of this
study. In the case of NAFTA, concerns about the stability of the south-
ern neighbor and the resulting ﬂows of immigrants into the United
States played a role in motivating the free trade agreement. The agree-
ments with Chile also had an important function for the United States
and the EU by setting high standards for the protection of intellectual
property rights, reﬂecting the rule-making function of PTAs as
described by Katada et al. (in press). Japan’s trade agreements undoubt-
edly have a strategic diplomacy aspect, especially since China has
started to negotiate trade agreements with important providers of nat-
ural resources and food products in southeast Asia and the Paciﬁc.
On a theoretical level, the explanation put forth in this work does not
endeavor to capture all the forces at work in the current proliferation of
preferential trade agreements. PTAs can also be used to express political
support when strategic interests are at stake, as in the case of the United
States–Jordan FTA and the follow-up initiative to establish a regional
free trade zone in the Middle East. Likewise, in cases of PTAs between
countries of very similar levels of development, other considerations,
such as achieving economies of scale, will be of central importance. As a
ﬁnal limitation, this study does not attempt to provide a generalized
explanation of the policy choices of the developing country partner.
A theoretical appraisal has been put forth by Shadlen (2005), while
Cameron (1997), Grugel and Hout (1999), Pastor and Wise (1994)
and Haggard (1995) offer individual country studies in Latin America
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and southeast Asia. My focuses is speciﬁcally on the convergence of
interests between North and South that favors the narrow kind of
liberalization evident in recent PTAs.
The book offers three speciﬁc contributions. First, it breaks new
ground by explicitly theorizing and tracing the competitive dynamic
between North–South PTAs. The argument helps to resolve two long-
standing puzzles in international political economy by explaining the
regional variation in preferential trade agreements and the sudden surge
in their popularity since the mid-1990s.
Second, the study underscores the importance of the political interests
in developed countries that emerge with foreign direct investment and
vertical trade integration. It shows that multinational ﬁrms exercise a
profound inﬂuence on the character of North–South trade agreements
that often results in special interest politics running counter to the spirit
of free trade. Prominent critics of preferential deals such as Jagdish
Bhagwati and Anne Krueger (Bhagwati and Krueger 1995) have issued
early warnings of such an outcome based on grounds of principle. This
study shows that the convergence of interests between developed and
developing countries on ﬂows of foreign direct investment from North
to South only exacerbates the issues these scholars have highlighted.
Finally, it presents evidence against the case that preferential trade
agreements can provide support for multilateral liberalization at the
level of the WTO: given the political temptation to create non-tariff
barriers to make North–South agreements feasible, these deals will
satisfy multinational ﬁrms, a key constituency that previously offered
the necessary counterweight to protectionist forces in the WTO. But
liberalization is likely going to be limited to the goods these ﬁrms want
to trade. The onerous rules and regulations typical of North–South
PTAs will prevent many smaller ﬁrms from developed economies and
most exporters from developing countries from realizing the gains of
liberalization.
In addition to the agreements analyzed here, the account can be
applied to a growing number of cases. Because of the weight given to
the interests of services ﬁrms, US PTAs with South and Central
American countries are likely to disadvantage ﬁrms from the EU.
European negotiating positions vis-à-vis the Andean Community and
the four Central American countries have been accordingly inﬂuenced
by considerations of equal access for FDI. This also holds for Canadian
initiatives, often in the tailwind of US PTAs. Although these two
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countries’ PTAs with Colombia have important security dimensions,
they also affect the relative position of European ﬁrms. Japanese PTAs
with southeast Asian countries, as well as the EU’s Mediterranean
agreements, have in turn stimulated various bilateral initiatives of the
United States, including agreements with Morocco, South Africa, and
the ASEAN countries. Moreover, with some qualiﬁcations the argu-
ment can be extended to cover initiatives between developing countries
where foreign direct investment ﬂows predominantly in one direction,
such as South Korea–Mexico and South Korea–Chile. As more
advanced developing country ﬁrms from Brazil, China, and India invest
in other developing countries, these new FDI home countries will like-
wise be pulled into a global competition.
The organization of the book
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical
argument for when and why preferential trade agreements between
developed and developing countries become viable, and why they trig-
ger a round of countermoves towards bilateral agreements. The expla-
nation is developed based on a simpliﬁed model of two countries
exporting FDI and one seeking to attract it, building on theories of
vertical integration of production across country borders.
Chapter 3 focuses on NAFTA as the ﬁrst case study. Under pressure
from multinational manufacturing and service industries, the United
States begins to target individual states for market opening, while
promoting the same issues in the WTO from the mid-1980s on.
Bilateral investment treaties and service negotiations form the templates
that ultimately lead to the respective chapters in NAFTA, which in turn
becomes the model for future FTAs. The chapter takes stock of the
lobbying efforts of various industries before and during the negotia-
tions, relating them to the selectively protectionist outcome and tracing
to the demands of ﬁrms the emergence of NAFTA’s strict rules of origin.
Chapter 4 shows that following the conclusion of NAFTA, European
manufacturers and service providers began to lobby their governments
to seek solutions against the discriminatory arrangement. Given the
strong interest of European service providers, in particular the Spanish
ﬁnancial sector, the EU moved quickly to the conclusion of an inter-
mediate “framework agreement,” followed by a fully ﬂedged FTA.
Lobbying takes place around the Directorate General for Trade of the
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European Commission and the Article 133 Committee (coordinating
member states’ interests and Community trade policy), in which
Spanish interests clashed with protectionist forces from France. In the
manufacturing sector, German automotive ﬁrms, in particular
Volkswagen, emerged as key supporters of a bilateral agreement with
Mexico.
Chapter 5 focuses on the Japanese reaction to NAFTA. Since invest-
ment by Japanese ﬁrms was concentrated in the manufacturing of
electronics and automobiles, the discriminatory effect of NAFTA was
limited to a smaller number of companies, many of them located in
Mexican export processing zones (EPZs). Japanese electronics and
automotive ﬁrms ﬁrst unsuccessfully exhausted all possibilities of liber-
alization between Mexico and Japan. The eventual conclusion of the
EU–Mexico agreement convinced policymakers in the trade and foreign
affairs bureaucracy to move towards a policy of free trade agreements.
Chapter 6 traces the competitive dynamic between ﬁrms from the
United States and the EU in the negotiations for a free trade agreement
with Chile. Although investment in Chile is mostly limited to the service
sector, the competitive dynamic was sufﬁcient to motivate the United
States and the EU to seek FTAs to secure equal access. Due to the lack of
fast-track authority, the United States was unable to conclude an agree-
ment with Chile before the EU. As a result of the EU move, intense
lobbying in the United States drove the rapid conclusion of an agree-
ment with evidently defensive aspects.
Chapter 7 focuses on two cases in which manufacturing industries
dominated the negotiations. In the Japanese FTA negotiations with
Thailand and Malaysia, the automobile industries and electronics
industries played central roles, supported by a variety of intermediate
goods producers. For the ﬁrst time, Japanese ﬁrms are producing goods
in southeast Asia not for exports to the US market, but for reimport to
Japan. In both agreements, the vertical integration of trade strongly
shapes the pattern of liberalization, leading to rapid tariff reductions on
some goods and blanket exclusions for others, mostly “sensitive” agri-
cultural products. Mirroring the agreements in Latin America, both the
United States and the EU react by announcing negotiations with
Malaysia and Thailand.
Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes that preferential trade agree-
ments between North and South are ﬁrst and foremost the product of
the greater importance of foreign direct investment. The resulting
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pattern of liberalization that privileges the interests of multinational
ﬁrms has implications for how PTAs will impact the multilateral trade
regime. While the current proliferation of PTAs does not herald the
reemergence of protectionist blocs, it threatens to undermine the sup-
port of important industries for multilateral negotiations, because their
demands are met in bilateral and regional arrangements. At the same
time it creates a patchwork of competing rules that mainly beneﬁt the
concentrated interests of a few multinational ﬁrms but offer less effec-
tive liberalization for smaller ﬁrms or those from developing countries.
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